In 2000, the Rwandan government began the phased introduction of a decentralisation programme throughout the country. The programme aimed at countering citizen's exploitation and marginalisation -a principal driver of the 1994 genocide -through broadbased participation in local development planning. This article analyses the extent to which Rwanda's evolving decentralisation process is meeting this aim. Tracking a shift in emphasis from local political participation to economic growth, it argues that increased technocratisation and centralised control combined with poor policy responsiveness and low levels of local government legitimacy are undermining post-conflict reconstruction.
Introduction
While concern has been expressed at the ruling regime's suppression of political opposition 9 , its activities in Eastern Congo 10 and, most recently, the decision by President Kagame to run for a third term in 2017 11 , Rwanda's meteoric rise as reflected through a range of development indicators is nonetheless significant and the country stands as a model for postconflict reconstruction and development for others within the Great Lakes region and beyond 12 . Decentralisation has played a large part in this remarkable story. Launched on a phased basis in 2000, the ambitious programme aimed at countering citizen's exploitation and marginalisation -a principal driver of the 1994 genocide -through broad-based participation in local development planning, building trust and cooperation across villages and enhancing local state-community relations throughout the country. Taking a historical approach, this article examines the extent to which this evolving process is managing to achieve this. Tracking a shift in focus from local political participation to economic growth and development, research findings present evidence of increased technocratisation and centralised control over the process; a mismatch between community and local authority priorities; and low levels of local government legitimacy. As parallels with the coercive, exploitative practices of the past emerge, and pressures and demands on local communities to invest physically and financially in development priorities not of their choosing increase, it is argued that the shift in focus and approach within the decentralisation process risks pushing communities too far, increasing their marginalisation, frustration and resentment, exacerbating local tensions, and undermining post-conflict reconstruction. The findings presented here reinforce existing studies which point to centralised control of the process 13 and add to this literature by considering the implications of this for ongoing stability and post-conflict reconstruction in the country.
The article draws on relevant policy and field research which was conducted by the author in 14 .The project forms part of a broader programme of research on decentralisation and post-conflict reconstruction in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Rwanda respectively 15 . Research sites, drawing on the National Institute for Statistical Research (NISR) district profiles, were selected to reflect both geographic and socio-economic diversity and include one of the wealthiest and one of the poorest districts in the country 16 . Logistical assistance was provided by an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) which works on governance and human rights in Rwanda for transportation, personal introductions to local authorities, and the engagement of an independent translator (translating from Kinyarwanda to French where necessary) . Due to the politically sensitive nature of academic research in Rwanda, the international NGO wishes to remain anonymous. Semi-structured interviews with 99 randomly selected residents (every third woman and man encountered on transect walks through villages -50 female; 49 male) and 23 semi-structured interviews with local authorities (nine at district level; eight at sector level; and six at cell level selected by myself) were conducted in total across the six sites. In addition, field research included a structured observation of an umuganda local planning session in Kigali, and semi-structured interviews with two national government officials; three NGOs; and eight international donor representatives. The methodological challenges of conducting interviews in a divided society where history is highly contested and freedom of speech limited has been discussed in detail elsewhere 17 .
Challenges include the nature of historical memory, selective telling, and difficulties assembling representative groups. Moreover, my own positionality as a white, female researcher with links to an international NGO posed additional challenges, as did the positionality of both my NGO colleagues and translator. I attempted to mitigate some of these by selecting the officials I wished to meet myself (although this was necessarily also determined by their own availability); daily debriefings with my translator to attempt to uncover and correct for any bias; arriving unannounced to villages each day; conducting all interviews on a voluntary, one-to-one basis in private; emphasising at the outset that I did not work for the government or any NGO; and assuring anonymity of all interviewees (no names were recorded -all interviewees were assigned a numerical code). While issues of bias and selective telling remain inevitable, I hoped that these might be minimised through these measures.
The article is structured as follows. The following section provides a historical overview and reviews the rich body of literature on the complex range of factors underpinning the genocide. Moving beyond simplistic accounts of ethnic antagonisms, it highlights in particular the psycho-sociological impacts of the acute political marginalisation and exploitation of vast swathes of the country's population by its local and national political elite and international aid actors alike through the government's decentralised structures and practices. The link between post-conflict reconstruction and decentralisation in this context is discussed in the third section where a framework for the field research is set out. Section four provides an overview of the aims and evolution of the decentralisation programme and policy. It highlights in particular its shift in focus, in the mid-2000s, from local participation in decision-making and planning to economic growth. Findings from the fieldwork are presented in Sections Five to Seven inclusive. Following the framework set out in Section Three, findings are organised into sub-sections on inclusive governance, policy responsiveness and local government legitimacy respectively. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for the country's ongoing stability.
Rwanda's genocide -the background
The horrors of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its aftermath have been well documented.
The brutal extermination of eight hundred thousand people over the space of one hundred days has led to much interrogation and questioning -both of the international community's lack of action in the face of such an egregious atrocity, and of the internal tensions and 
Post-conflict reconstruction and decentralisation
Much of the early literature in the field of post-conflict reconstruction drew from a liberal framework which, aimed primarily at stabilisation, focused on political and economic liberalisation. Within this framework, reconstruction efforts focused on national level initiatives such as the elaboration of elite, power-sharing agreements, the organisation of elections, and the promotion of economic growth through liberalised market-based economies 29 . The relative failure of such liberal prescriptions in many countries however, has led to much questioning and critique, and more recent contributions highlight the need for more contextualised, country-specific understandings conflict. Arguing that liberal frameworks only serve to reinforce the hegemonic status quo, leaving its inherent inequalities and selective privileges to a ruling elite intact, much of this more recent literature focuses in particular on the local drivers of conflict, in particular the marginalisation and exploitation (real or perceived) of different groups and communities 30 .
Focusing on these key drivers, which include poverty and inequality as well as political manipulation and exclusion 31 and, in line with this local turn, post-conflict reconstruction initiatives which promote more inclusive access to resources and institutions, which devolve power and voice to more marginalised groups and communities, and which end discrimination against particular groups, including women, are promoted. In this context, reconstruction efforts now often include longer term policies and programmes in the areas of local governance and decentralisation. Recognising that national elites tend to revert to strategies that reproduce their positions of power, the aim behind local governance reforms and decentralisation programmes is to dilute these strategies, devolving power and authority to heretofore marginalised actors and communities 32 . In this context, analysts argue that decentralisation can mitigate conflict at local levels by placing limits on the power of the centre through mechanisms of inclusive governance, thereby affording some degree of local autonomy. This, the argument goes, enhances service delivery and government responsiveness to the needs and priorities of local communities which, in turn, increases state legitimacy and support at local levels 33 .
This elite monopolisation of power and privilege referred to in the broader literature, strongly resonates with the socio-political climate in Rwanda pre-1994. As we have seen in the previous section, this constituted one of the key drivers of the subsequent genocide. In the following section we see that the country's current decentralisation programme was developed with these drivers in mind and, on paper at least, with the ambition of reversing the marginalising and exploitative policies and practices of the past, thereby increasing local government responsiveness. Bearing in mind that the normative ideals of decentralisation do not always live up to its practice and experience 34 , the remainder of this article focuses on the degree to which Rwanda's evolving process is doing so. Drawing its framework from the relevant literature explored above, it explores the aims of the programme; local mechanisms for inclusive governance; policy responsiveness to local priorities; and community's knowledge and use of local government structures.
Decentralisation and reconstruction in Rwanda: Shifting priorities
The normative potential of decentralisation for post-conflict reconstruction appeared to be recognised by the new Rwandan regime when it introduced its ambitious decentralisation programme in 2000 following a period of relative flux after the genocide. Taken together therefore, these somewhat subtle and at times ambiguous shifts in policy over time appear to suggest that, while the decentralisation programme initially purported to aim at breaking with the top-down, manipulative structures and practices of the past, by placing citizen participation in local planning and decision-making at its heart, as time has evolved, increasing centralist tendencies and growing pressures and demands on communities to meet ambitious development targets echo these manipulative structures and practices of the past. This is evidenced in an increased emphasis within the relevant policies on participation as communal labour (now enshrined within Article 47 of the revised Constitution) and increased local taxation aimed at achieving local fiscal autonomy. In addition, a greater influence of central authorities in planning is apparent within the new climate of 'fast-track' economic development and there is a reduced emphasis on local planning and decision-making.
While this is evident in policy, its manifestation in practice and, importantly, the implications of these developments for post-conflict construction and social and political stability in the country more broadly remain under-explored. In particular, it remains to be seen if the increased demands on local communities are yielding outcomes which respond to their needs -i.e. if decentralisation, although now centrally devised and imposed, is responsive to local needs and priorities. In addition, the quality of relations between local authorities and communities remains to be explored. These aspects are the focus of the following section.
Shifting priorities and post-conflict reconstruction within communities
The following subsections draw on fieldwork to explore the implications of these shifting government priorities for ongoing stability and reconstruction in the country. Following the normative aspirations set out in the literature reviewed in Section Three, fieldwork explored levels of inclusivity and participation in local decision-making structures; programme and policy responsiveness to local priorities; and community knowledge of and engagement with local authorities and structures. This latter aspect was explored as a proxy for local government legitimacy on the assumption that high levels of voluntary engagement with and knowledge of these structures would indicate a level of legitimacy. The findings set out below demonstrate increased centralisation and control over local decision-making; a poor level of policy and programme responsiveness; and low levels of legitimacy for local government authorities and structures.
Inclusive local governance mechanisms
Two practices were developed to assure local participation in planning and decision-making in phase I of the programme -ubudehe and umuganda respectively. Developments within these are outlined in turn below. simply reflect its higher levels of poverty and marginalisation. As to ubudehe's demise as a local planning mechanism, local officials and quite a number of civil society representatives argue that its spirit continues in the dialogue, discussions and planning sessions which take place at monthly umuganda meetings. This is discussed below.
Umuganda
Umuganda refers to the tradition, prevalent in the Great Lakes region since the colonial era, of obligatory communal labour on public projects. In Rwanda, umuganda labour works officially take place on the last Saturday of every month when, following the communal labour, meetings are held where community issues and plans are debated and agreed upon.
This represents a significant difference to pre-genocide umuganda processes where no discussions took place. The issues raised at these umuganda meetings, officials stress, feed upward to cell, sector, and district plans with, every five years, a formal upward-planning process taking place for the development of the District Development Plan (DDP). Yet none of the local officials interviewed were able to outline precisely how competing or contrasting demands are addressed or how local priorities are decided upon for these DPPs. At district level, national (EDPRS) and international (MDG) frameworks were cited as important in setting development objectives, yet the link to local priorities remains opaque. A representative from one of the donor agencies supporting decentralisation claims that the current 5-yearly district planning process, tellingly coordinated this time round by the Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Local Government as is the norm, was conducted in considerable haste and constituted merely a desk-based exercise with no field visits or use of local plans of any sort 52 .
Although the link between umuganda discussions and the district planning process appears weak or non-existent therefore, discussions do indeed take place following the completion of communal labour. The form of communication acts (instructing, questioning, proposing, advocating, criticising etc.) and the discourses employed demonstrate the increasingly centralising tendencies of local governance. A structured observation of an umuganda session in a residential neighbourhood in Kigali confirmed interviewees' assertions that the main purpose of these meetings is to instruct residents on the latest centrally-driven development plans and their roles and responsibilities within these. Taking place outside the local government authority's office following several hours of communal work clearing ditches, seven local officials and approximately 300 community members attended. Over its 50 minutes' duration, officials spoke for 40 with their contributions centring on the announcement of a series of new taxes (for refuse collection and school building maintenance) and fines and penalties (for failing to attend or to bring a hoe to monthly umuganda sessions). The meeting also included interventions from 12 community members (10 men, 2 women), with six of these insisting on the right to speak as the chair tried to bring proceedings to a close. Nine of these community interventions were complaints about the new taxes, two related to a local theft and the final one was a proposal (rejected as it is not in the district plan) to use next month's umuganda work to repair the local bridge. Overall, the substance, tenor and tone of local authority contributions stifled rather than facilitated debate and revealed paternalistic attitudes and disciplinary intent as officials repeatedly stressed the responsibility of all to contribute, rebuking those who questioned local government plans. As noted by a number of interviewees with whom this observation was discussed, it is likely that levels of both community dissent and officials' tolerance levels for these are lower in rural areas. However, as travel is prohibited on umuganda days, efforts to attend a session at one of the research sites were thwarted at the first road block.
Taken together, the two principal practices of local participation in planning and decisionmaking do indicate significant breaks from the past when citizens were afforded no space to express their views and opinions and dissent was not tolerated in any form. Both ubudehe and umuganda represent new structures with the express purpose of providing a space for citizen voice. However, the practice of employing these new spaces as spaces for
'sensitisation' and instruction on top-down directives rather than as spaces for deliberation and shared decision-making sharply resonate with practices of the past, and relations with local authorities -key to post conflict reconstruction -may be coming under increasing strain. In the following two sections we examine these relations more closely, first through an examination of local authority responsiveness in addressing local priorities and needs; and second through an examination of communities' use of and engagement with local authorities in both resolving local conflicts and in addressing problems with services.
Policy and programme responsiveness
Proponents of decentralisation as an effective element of post-conflict reconstruction emphasise its role in increasing the effectiveness and responsiveness of policy and programming in addressing local priorities and needs. In this section community prioritiesexplored with individual residents -are compared with those outlined by local officials where the latter form the basis of local policy and programming.
As detailed in the previous section, the decentralised practices of ubudehe and umuganda, in theory, facilitate community participation in the identification of local priorities and issues.
These, the theory goes, are then fed upward through cell, sector and district planning processes and form the basis of both the DDPs and prioritised activities at more local levels. district, sector and cell levels were asked to rank, in order of importance, the main priorities for communities within their jurisdictions. The resultant coded and collated data is synopsised in Table 1 below. Number one in each column indicates the collective top-ranked issue, number two the second, and so on. While the findings for residents indicate a clear-cut collective ranking (seven issues, each with its individual ranking), officials' (at cell, sector and district levels) collective rankings show an equal priority for some issues. For example, cell leaders collectively ranked domestic conflict and violence, food security and land consolidation, and cell office construction as equal priorities in fourth place. -3  Roads  ---1  ICT and computer literacy  ---2  Electricity  ---3 For residents interviewed, the top three issues (in order of priority -domestic conflict and violence; food security and land access; and access to health services (denied for those who fail to pay their annual health premium)) reflect the multidimensionality of poverty and its effects on psychological as well as physical wellbeing. For local officials, the top three issues (collection of annual health insurance premiums from all households; family planning (for population control); and the development of local savings and credit cooperatives)
display an adherence to the national government's priorities and programmes 53 . Indeed, local officials note that a failure to meet 80 per cent of their targets (which, drawing from national priorities, include these three issues) means they lose their jobs, so clearly the pressures are immense.
Overall, while the findings do indicate some degree of congruency between community and local authority priorities (residents' top three priorities of domestic conflict / violence, food security, and health are all reflected in the priorities of cell and sector leaders), significant differences exist in how these issues are framed, and thus, in the solutions proposed. For example, while domestic conflicts arising from, inter alia, acute income poverty, stress and unequal power relations, constitute a key issue for residents, such conflicts are identified as a priority for local authorities only in so far as they impact negatively on centrally driven targets including agricultural productivity and primary educational enrolment rates 54 .
Moreover, it is doubtful that the solutions proposed by officials -'regularisation' of marriages 55 and instructing couples not to fight -will address the complex relational issues underlying this problem. Indeed, as other analysts have noted 56 , the technocratic and formulistic implementation of the country's much heralded gender equality policies within the framework of a narrow economic rationale has minimal impact on local gender norms, practices and relations, particularly in the context of the state's co-option of the once vibrant women's movement. Thus, while the findings indicate some level of congruence in priorities at cell and sector levels, the responses proposed are more aimed at meeting national growth targets than meeting local needs.
Local government legitimacy
On the assumption that levels of voluntary engagement with and knowledge of local government structures and authorities constitute an indication of a level of legitimacy, interviews with local residents sought to explore these factors. Interviewees, asked to identify the principal role of village level authorities, cited (though with significant gender differences) three main roles. Thirty-six per cent of interviewees (52 per Interviewees were also asked if they knew anything about their district budget. 97 per cent (equal male and female) responded that no, they have never heard of this, while 2 per cent (all male) claim to have heard it mentioned in meetings. One per cent (all female) declined to respond. These findings suggest a low level of knowledge of the role of district authoritiesparticularly among women, thereby suggesting a low level of legitimacy and trust.
Although 58 per cent of interviewees were unsure of the role of district authorities, all interviewees had views on the role of their local, village level authorities as reflected above.
Interviewees were asked, given these roles, how often they have gone to their local authorities with an issue to be resolved. 57 .
The findings also demonstrate strong continuities with the past, with citizens associating local authorities, more strongly than anything else, with organising umuganda communal labour and transferring the orders and directives from higher authorities downward to citizens. This echoes local authority practices in the pre-1994 era, and stands in stark contrast to the more accountable, responsive one promoted within official rhetoric. At district level, the findings are unequivocal in pointing toward a very low level of awareness of the role and work of district level authorities and practically no awareness of budgetary priorities or plans.
Overall, the findings reported in this section highlight relatively poor levels of political inclusion and policy responsiveness and are, in the main, strongly reflective of the more authoritarian and centralist form of leadership exerted in the pre-1994 era, together with a highly technocratic approach to development more broadly. While undoubtedly effective in driving the country's impressive macro-level growth and development, the strong historic resonances emanating from the research findings should perhaps give some pause for thought when considered in a historic context.
Conclusion: Decentralisation reconfigured -What implications for
Rwanda's future stability?
The aim of this research was to explore the evolving role of decentralisation in Rwanda's post-conflict reconstruction. Tracking changes in both policy and in local participatory mechanisms, the evidence presented has demonstrated a shift in focus over time, from local political participation to fast-track economic growth and development. This has entailed increased centralisation and technocratisation of the process, together with increased demands on communities. These findings support those of other researchers on various aspects of the process and highlight parallels with the past in relation to the pre-genocide regime's policies and practices of decentralisation.
It could be argued that such developments are not, in and of themselves, a bad thing however.
After all, there is no evidence of residents clamouring to be involved in local decisionmaking and macro-level indicators, although plateauing, remain impressive. Indeed, in many ways the Rwandan process is a good example of a "good enough" governance mechanism and feeds nicely into the current donor vogue for "what works in Africa" 58 . However, when considered in the broader context of post-conflict reconstruction and stability, the additional evidence presented here is of immediate relevance. Findings which demonstrate a mismatch between community and local authority priorities coupled with low levels of local government legitimacy suggest that the reality of decentralisation in contemporary Rwanda represents more a continuity than a break with the past. And, as the findings on
decentralisation from other jurisdictions demonstrate, this does not bode well for the country's ongoing stability and reconstruction as a number of the key factors which support post-conflict reconstruction -notably a devolution in power; more inclusive local governance; enhanced local policy responsiveness; and increased local government legitimacy -are being increasingly undermined.
At a time when post-conflict reconstruction success stories are hard to come by and political authorities and constituents in donor countries increasingly difficult to placate, Rwanda stands as a beacon of hope for Africa and the aid industry alike. Against a backdrop of escalating violence and suffering in neighbouring Burundi and DRC, the images, messages and statistics promulgated by the Kigali regime prove tantalising and alluring. Yet, like the many domestic conflicts which play out under the shiny tin roofs glinting in the sun in villages throughout the country, we should remember that shiny, modern veneers can mask deeper problems. And we should remember that the international aid community has been blinded by such veneers before. As parallels with the coercive, exploitative practices of the past emerge, and pressures and demands on local communities to invest physically and financially in development priorities not of their choosing increase, the tentative social contract forged over twenty years ago may well be under threat. The challenge now for adherents and proponents of decentralisation is to learn from and not replicate history.
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